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ABSTRACT
near Hidair Collisions - T'ne atent of the Hazard
to General Aviation in Utah, Nevada,
and Idaho
by
Robert B. Hulsman
Haster of Business Adminh;tration
Utah State University , 1970
Hajor Profess or: Dr . Robert c. Hecham
Departn~nt:
Business Administration
This thesis randomly sampled the general avia tion pilot
population of Utah, Nevada , and Idaho fo r the purpose of
determininG the extent of the near midair collis ion hazards
in these areas.

The conditions investir,ate d were all pos-

sible situations associated with a flight, and all that
could be readily answered on a data form ,;ithout encountering
bias in the study.
The thes i s provided certain insir,hts into <That hazards
are to be expected in the general aviation population of the
three states under study.

It also i ndicated as much as pos-

sible, 'fhat the causes Here of the ha zards and l·That actions
could be taken to remedy or, at best, lessen them.

(73 pages)

INTRODUCTION

Aviation is one of the

n~tions

fastest

growin~

industrJes.

In 1917 , for instance, the strength of the entire United
StatfOs ai r a rm
Beyond, 1968).
:;on ,

1 S>4L~- 450,

eTaS

35 oilots ana 55 airp lanes (Above and

In 19 ~.0 He h•1d 17,351 civil aircraft,

U!an -

in 19)0 th ~t number h'ld increased to ';2,80')

(ull:n:: m, 1951) , and in 1':68 it 3tood o.t 179 , 285 (Lerner,

1970) .

The increase from 1917 to 1940 i3 quite hi[;:, , t-rhich

i_; to be exoecte d since this was tlvo period of initi a l

;lc centn.nce nnd .rsrowth in ·tv:ln.tion hi::to .r y .

The t en year

'"l Oriod between 19L:.O and 1950 saH an increase of abou t Le25'~;
be tween 19)0 and 1960 it was aporoxima tely 23 . 47; , and c:luring
the period between 1960 and 1968, our growth in civil air cr 'lft Has at 60 .8%.

The -:;reatest ~roHth du::oing tho -::>'lst

ten years ·,;as in general a v iation aircraft.

~lany

of tho

sma ll p r iv ate ai rcraft of the 191>0 1 s f leH at an average
speed of 60 - 70 miles per hour.
oxcood 1 , 800 miles per hour.

How He have aircraft th'lt
The future promi ses us air -

craf t capable of speeds o f 6 , 000 mph , Hith ranges of 10 , 000
m:Lles .

Th ese ai rcr :>ft Hi 11 be flyJ.ng at al ti tude3

UD

to

150 , 000 feet above sea l e vel (Above 11nd Beyond , 1968 ) .
~uture of a vio.tion l oo~s very ~ood indeed.

·rho

Table 1 makes

comp'lrisons of manufacture r's shiornents of comulet c' genera l
aviation aircraft .

'fhe fir;uros in th'c t:J.blo in cl ude all

aircraft , both domestic and export.

The ohenomenn.l groHth

2

of gen e ral aviation is qu i t e apparent from the statistics
? resented here, but •·ri t h (';rowth also comes other less app aren t

p roble~s .

3efore gett ing into these problems a look at

c..viation as-a-.. .rholc mi r;ht b e i n order.

To.ble l,

Eanufacturer 1 s Shipr,wn t s of Aircraft

Tyne Ai rcr aft

1960a.

Si ;:;nle-engine

6 l~3 8

10131~

57

1- to 3- nlo.ce

1366

4ll1+ 7

226

4-place and up

5 072

5687

12

liulti-engine

1288

2388

G6

Total s

7726

12522

62

1969a

Percent Change

aLerner , 1970

Aviation can be subdivided into three broad categories:
g eneral aviation, commercial airline aviation,
aviation ,

a~d

milita ry

This study •·rill not concern itself Hith airline

or military operations except in connection Hith general
aviation ,

General aviation is comprised of all aircraft

;roi{3hing le ss than 12,500 pou:1ds and includes all privately
m·med air craft, business aircraft , commercial a ir taxi and
charter operations, agricultural operations, f light instruction operations,

e;~perimcntal

balloons, ::md Gliders .

aircraft, a!'!tique aircr aft,

It e;;cludes those aircraft oncrating

in a ccordance uith Federal Aviation Ile::;ulation (FAR} , Volume
VII, Part 121, Certific a tion and Operation:
and Commerci al Operators of Large Aircraft ,

Air Car riers

3
The r esult of the g ro..rth in gene ral aviation can be evi denced by the fact tha t many of our a irp orts are fast becoming too small to a cco mo d ate the ever-increasi n g
of aircraft ,

n~~ber

Penetration into the airport traff ic area an d

wa ke turbulence are examp les of increased hazards .

As an

illustration, Figure 1 sh ows how tHo aircraft, both entering
the traff ic ar e a of an airp ort, c o uld come into contact Hith
one anothe r,

The re as ons for this c ould be either a lack of

vigilance, by either or both pilots , or restrictions to visibility due to t he aircrafts ' st r ucture or weather conditions.
Tho same situation avails itself when a low wing a irnlane is
de scending upon a hi gh viinz airplane .

Neither of the pilots

are is a positio n to s o e the other a ircraft as depicted in
Figure 2.

It is als o p ossible for a larg e jet trans p ort ,

such as a Boeing 727, to cause sufficien t Hake turbulence to
render other a ircraft out of control.

A:n aircraft "caught"

in the ;Jake of another lar ge r airplane will involuntarily
execute s everal rolling maneuvers before it can re cover .

If

this happens close to the g round , such a s on final app ro ach
to a landing, i t could result in disaster,

Wake turbulence

of this intensity is common at airports servic ed by the airlines .

It is r ecognized that the grea test hazards to , or

the !)Ote ntial collisions of, light aircraft are in close
p roximity to ai rports .

That is, aircraft are more suscept-

ible to midair collisionc while the pilo t is pre occupied with
oth er du ties such as oerformin g pre - landing or pos t-take off
c h ecklists .

4

Figure 1.

Boeing 727 Des cending Upon a Light Aircraft

Figure 2 .

Blind Spot Overlap of LoH Wing Helative to a
High Hing Aircr a ft
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Background
This study concerns itself , not •,;ith midair collisions,
but with "near" midair co l lisions .

A near mida ir collision

is s aid to have occur red if one or both of the pi lo ts in volv e d fotmd it necessary to take immediate evasive action
i n order to prevent a colli sion .

This condition is s a id to

have constituted a h a zar dous situation.

A near midair col-

lision is a lso said to have oc curred if two aircraft come
in very close p roximi ty to each other but not so close as
to have caused a collision if no evasive a ction was taken .
'i'his condit ion is said to hav e
situation .

con~ti t

ut ed a non- hazardous

This definition does not inc lude those ac t ion s

re quired by law, as pertain to norma l right -of -way ma neuv e ring (FAR , Volume VI, Par t 9 1, 1970) .
many pi lots are involve d in near midai r
unreported .

It is assumed tha t
collisions th a t g o

The numb er that have been reporte d , hot.;ever ,

has been significant e nough to c a us e the F e de ral Aviation
A~min istration (FAA)

to be come concerne d .

As a r esu lt t he

FAA has instituted a p r o(i r am designed to me asure t he extent
of the hazar d .

FAA Adv isory Circular (AC) 00 - 23 , Near J.lid-

a ir Collision Reporting, eff e ctive January l, l 96ll , ini. ti ated wha t Has intended to be a one year study of the hazard .
Th e AC p rovides the pilot or creH member with a questionaire
form t-Thich is the sourc e of data for th·3

3

tudy.

The AC al so

cont a ins a st a teme nt advising al l pe rsons involved t hat the
" FAA Administrator will not s ubj ect a ny pe rson involv ed in
a near midair collisio n to en forc ement or other a dv erse

6
action , reme dial or di s ciplinary, ev e n though a violation
of the Federal Aviation Ke g ulations is disclosed by the re p ort or subsequent investigation".

The study has since

been extended t'-1ice , on ce t h rough December 31, 1969 by AC

00-23A, and again throur;h December 31, 1971 by AC 00 - 23B .
Purpose of the

St~

It i 3 hyp othesiz e d that many near midair collisions go
unreported due to ignorance of the reporting proc e dure , or
due to a fear of pros e cu t ion , or some other form of remedia l
action, by the FAA, e i the r
the future .

i~~e d iat e ly

or at some time in

It is felt that thi s f ear c a nnot be e a sily eli-

minated , or moderated to any great extent , even though the
Flli\ has declared the re p orting person imm~~e from disciplinary action.

Tne fact remains tha t the FAA is a reg u la tory

agency of the U. S . gove r n ment, and a s such they may find it
excee d ingly difficult to collect a dequate data for a valid
study.

On the basis of this hypothesis it is fe lt that an

independent study, conducted outside of the government , will
elicit better response and therefore a more accur ate indi cation of the extent of the hazards to general a vi ation .
This study will restrict itself to the states of Utah,
I! evada , and Idaho .

The results of this study may , hoHever ,

be valid , in a general sense, for an y st a te .

The e:z:tent or

se veri ty of the hazards will v o.ry from state to st2te cl.e nendin,o; on a number of f a ctors such as pilot o.ttitud e, populo. tion , volume of air c raffic, and Reo g r a phico.l p roxicni ty to
h ic;h density industri o. l areas .

In other Hords this study
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will indicate t he severity of the hazards to general aviation in Uta.'!, Nevada, and Idaho, but the findings may be
app li cable in other states.

The exact degree of appl icabil-

ity 1vould require further study in the geo gr aphical area
of concern.
The hazards to general aviation >·lill be determined by
seeking the ansiiers to several que st ions.
l.

'.'/hat percentas e of the flying population becomes

involved in near midair colli s ions?
2.

Are v1eather conditions a si gnificant factor in near

midair collisions, it so to uhat extent?

3.

Do near midair collisions occur more often while

operating under visual fli cht rules (VFn) then under instrument flight rules (IFR)?

4.

'•/hat type of navi c;ation is most of'ten used and is

this of any si gnificance in creating a hazard?

5.

Is there a signifi cant differnce in the level or

dec;ree of' exposure to a hazard betueen the various types of
operc.tion su ch us business , p leasure, air ta.x:i, etc.?

6.

1,'/hat particular fli r;ht attitude is more likely to

be associated l·lith a near mi dair collision?

7.

Is alti t ude a si snific ant factor in the near midair

co l lision pote.'1tial and if so, l·rhat is the most suscep tible
a ltitude?

8,

Is there any type or cate1ory of aircraft that has

a greater exposure rate and l·rhat is the reason for this?
9.

Do pilot qualifications or exuer ience levels have

8
~~y

effect on either the number

o~

i~cidents

or

t~e

hood of being subjected to a near midair co l lision?

likeli -
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PROCEDURE
The successful conclusion of a res earch p roject is dependent upon many factors, one of which is the proper identification of the universe from which a sample is taken.
For the purpose of this study the universe is defined as a l l
currently active pilots in Utah , Nevada, and Idaho certified
with the FAA.

This information was obtained from FAA records

at the General Aviation Dfu trict Office in Salt Lake City ,
Utah .

The FAA keeps their records up -to-date by reviewing

the currency of p ilot medical ce r tificates.

All pilots are

required to have a current medical certificate in their
p ossession at all times while exercising the privileges of
their airman certific ates ,

(FAR, Volume IX, Part 61, 1 970 ).

On this basis only active pilots have been included in the
population .
Determinin g the Sample Size
The numbe r of certificated pilots on file with the FAA
i n 1969 was 720 ,0 28 , of this number 679 , 596 are general
a viation oilots (Lerner , 1970) .

The numb er of pilots reg-

istered in Utah , Nevada, and Idaho is 10 , 975 ,

this then

becomes the size of the universe upon Hhich this study is
based .

Table 2 contains a breakdown of these pilots by

state , along with data of :<irports and airplanes .

With a

p opulation of thi s magnitude, sample size becomes a p rime

10
consideration.

In order to ge t some idea of the samp le size

required and o f the accuracy of the r esul ts, a Nonte Carlo
simulation wa s conducted (Simon, 1969 ).

An arbitrary start-

ing point of 500 pi lot s Has cho sen with the assumption that
twenty percent of them Hould be involve d in a near midair
collision.

Ten tr ial s were conducted using 500 pilots in

each trial.

A table of random numbers Has emp loyed as a

p roxy for the p ilots (Fisher and Yates , 1963) .

1~er e

Numbers

taken from the table such that the numbers 01 through 20
were p o s itive indicators of a n ear mi dair collision and all
nmnbers from 21 throu gh 100 ;;ere negative indicators.

At

the comp l etion of each trial the t otal numbers of posit iv e
indicators were compa r ed with the exp e cted mean of 20 pe rcent.
This percen tage dif f erence was noted in a separate colwnn .
The next nine t rials were conducted in t he same mann e r with
each o f the percentage di f fe r ences being not ed .

The ten

differences Her e then totaled and divided by the number of
trials to give an average pe rcent age of error.

In this case

the aver ag e percentage of error, o r in statistical terms ,
the standard error of me as urement, was 1.3 percent.

\ma t

this means is that with a sample size of 500 pilots, there
is a possibility , according to the assumptions dra~m ear lier,
that 18 .7 to 21 . 3% of them vrould be invo lved in a near midair collision.

For the p urpose of this study an av erag e

pe rcen t ag e of error of 2 .6% could be toler ate d, there fore
a samp le siz e of 125 Hould be sufficient (Simon , 1969) .
othe r 1'rords if the percentage of er ror is d oubl ed , the

In
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Table

2.

State

Pilot, Populati on, Aircraft, and Airport
Comparisons
Airportsd

Pilots a

Populationb

Utah

3925

1, o1,5, ooo

772

82

Nevada

3425

~.57 ,000

972

107

Idaho

3625

718,000

1, 102

168

10 , 975

2, 220,000

2, 846

357

Totals

Aircraftc

a Pilots determined from FAA records in Salt Lake City,
January , 1971
bLerner ,

1970

COnly general aviation aircraft , Le~ner,

1970

dincludes public, private, j o int public and military,
excludes military alone, Lerner, 1970

sample size may be reduced to one quarter of its original
size .
As a further test, tHo of the l east likely fli Ght conditions to be involved in a midair collision Here evaluated
usin;; t he Honte Carlo techni que de s cribed aoove.

':'he:Je

conditions Here ; operating in o ositive controlled

air~pace,

and conducting a precision radar controlled approach to a
landing (PAR/GCA).

With an assumed samp le size of

folloHing conc lusions ;.rere drawn :

500

the

If the real near midair

c:ollision potential Hhile oper a ting i n p ositive controlled
airs pa ce is 1 percent , the average pe rcentage of err or ,,rill
be

0 . 36 pe rcent;

If t h e real p otential hazard ;.rhile conduc-

ting a 0 recision radar a op ro ach ( ?A~ /G CA) is

0.5

then the average perc e ntage of error Hill be

0 . 40 pe rcent .

p ercent,
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These

fi~ures

indicate that even those flight conditions

that have the most remote chances of occurring vrill be adequately included in a sample size of 500 or less.

By re-

ducing the sample size to 125 these average percentage of
error figures become quite large relative to the initial
conditions of
respectively.

lio

and 0.5%, and are 0 .72 and 0. 80 percent

This merely indicates that for more accuracy,

when considering small chances of occurrence, a larger
sample size is desiralbe.

See Appendix A for t he actual

data compiled for each of the Honte Carlo simulations described.
Another technique that may be employed, which in most
cases is more accurate, is the statistical method of determinig the sampling distribution of a proportion - the
standard error of p (the proportion), denoted by

Gf•

which

measur es chance variations of sample proportions given by

where

rr

is the

proportion of the samp le n, having a likely chance of occurrenee (Chou, 1969).

Using the fic;ures already identified

in the ~1onte Carlo simulation,

71

20(1-20)

;,oo

=

201., 6f

then becomes,

1.79%

Note that this method results in a larger standard error
than does the Nonte Carlo simulation (1.79 Vs 1.3).

The
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reason for this is that the l:onte Carlo method is l e ss accurate due to the number of trials conducte d.

If the r': onte

Carlo had been carried on Hi th n ore trials, the t;ro standard
errors HO 'J. ld approxima te one nnother.
Here again, if the sample size is redu ced to 125, the
standard error Hill double and becomes

3.58;;.

T:."e Samp ling Hethod
As in any sampling s urvey the question of nonres ponse
mer its special consideration.

Increasing the sample size

•-rill not ahmys compens :-tte for the effects of nonres;::: onse.
? or exareu le, if the nonres u onse is due solely to some random phenomena, an increase in
the situation .

sa~ple

size indeed corrects

If, hm·rover, nonres p onse follm-Ts some

systematic pa ttern, an increase in s llr.!p le size Hill not
correct it.

As

a~

illustration, sup p ose all nonres u ondents

•·TCre disinterested simply because they Here not involved in
a near midair collision, the result is a systematic pattern
of nonresponse.

The large r the sample becomes, the larss r

the systanatic nonres p onse
nQ~bers.

~rill

be in

ter~.1s

of a bsolute

Something must be done then to assure that non-

response is held to an abso lute minimum.
Pe rson a l intervieHs vrith each of the p ilot s sam::>led Has
out of the que s tion, therefore c. t echnique had to be d evel-

oped that would provide suffj.ciont motivat ion to s;;irmlo.te
response.

In tlcis ca :;c each uilot srunrJled Has p ro,rided

<ri th a p o st card in addition to the d a ta form and its cover
letter.

Se e the Aopendix for copies of these doc mnents.

The postcard contains the pilot's name together Hith the
folloHing statement, "I have mailed the completed data form
' Near Hidair Collision Data ' in res p onse to your independent
survey ".

It also contains a statement to indicate Hhether

or n ot the pi lot ;muld like to receive a copy of a summary
of the research results,

The latter statement was used to

further motivate the pilot to res o ond to the survey,

The

p ilot Has reassured in the cover letter that the p ostcard
(bearinG his name) and the data form (with no name) could
not be linked t ogether, thus insuring the anonymity of the
author of the data form .
As close to total res o onse as p ossib l e Has imperative if
the survey Has to be successful .

Each of the postcards

returned , then , was referenced to a listing of all pilots
surveye d ,

Those persons that did not respond were identi-

fied in this manne r and follow - up action was taken ,

This

action initially consi sted of mailing another letter (see
follow-up letter in Appendix E) , and da ta form emphasizing
again the need for some type of response,

Hopefu lly non-

response would have been eliminated, or at best be negli gible , as a result of the follow-up letter .

This was not

the case, however, because a significant number still had
not responded ,

A third letter was then dispatched with the

necessary data forms enclosed (see Appendix F) ,

At this

point it was dete rmined that the fe1-1 remaining nonrespondcnts would be of no cons equence and the sample survey Has
considered to be sufficiently val id to p rovide the needed

15
data.

This determination Has made by comparing the actual

responses obtained from each of the three letters.

On this

basis lt was determined that a fourth letter would result
in the same percentag e res p onse as the flrst three and
Hould change the resultant total near midair collisions
reported oy only one half of one percent .

These calculations

are lncluded in Appendix G.
The Data Form
The data form used (s e e Appendix B), is a copy of the
one contained in FAR AC 00 - 23 .

The data rorm, FAA Form

8020 -l, contains all o1' the data required oy this research
project .

Permission has been obtalned to u se the

~·orm

minor modi!'ications (Federal Register, November 1970).

with
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
General
The results obtained, and consequently the conclusions
drawn, from this rese arch effort will be effected to some
degree by the inabili ty of some pilots to recollect p ast
events ac cur at ely, a n d by missing those few pilots that
have been a ctive in past years but have not reneHed their
medical certificates in the current year.

It i s hoped that

the l att e r case tdll be very minimal considering that mo s t
pi lot s Hho d id not renetv their medical certificates 1-rere
i nactive physically a nyt·Tay.

If this assumption is correct

then the i r effect on the outcome of' t h i s study is n egli g itlle .
In the inte re st of time , the collection of pertinent data
on the basis of on- the-s pot observ at ions , or the collection
of data as the events occur red, was out of the que s tion.
Therefore the gathe ring of the required stati stic a l inform ation must be accomplished by the re li ance of p ilots to recall past event accurately over the past three years, January 1, 1968 through December 31, 1970, and to convey this
information l'aithfully in response to t his study.
Data
Tne data collect ed have been summari zed and appear in
Tables 3 through 22 .
p ropo rti on a l form .

The i nformat1.on ha s been tabulated in
Table 3 indicate s the actua l survey
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statistics with the percentage figures ci ven in terms of
the total number of pi lots surveyed .

Tables

4

through 22

s h ot-T percentages relativ e to the total near midair collisions
reported .

H.

The a ctual raw data appear in Table 28 ,

Appendix

This table ind icat es the numb e r of times an event took

p lace in the sample population.
~able,

this

Furthermore, all items in

with the exception of the first two items , re-

fle ct cond i~ions that actually occurr ed as rep orted by those
pilots e x pe rienc l n g a near midair collision.
~ lnce

a ll data do not readi ly adapt themselves to the

tabular form of presen t ation , certai n l nformat i on has been
provided in grapnic and pictora l l'orm .

Figures 3 and

4-

may

be used to determine the tlme a pil ot ha s a t his disposal
in or de r to initiate corrective action before a collision
\vill occur.

The speed and relati ve direction of tne two

aircraft ~~der consideration will have to be known in order
c o get the closure r a te in miles per hour.

Once this fi gure

has been determined , t ne velocity may be converted to feet
pe r second as dep icted in Figure 3 for 400 miles per hour .
vlhen the closing velocity is lmot-m in fe e t per second , Fig ure

4

is u sed to determine t!"le time available before a coll-

is ion will occur.

In order to use the graph one mu s t have a

fairly g ood estimate of the distance between the tHo aircr aft .

The application of distance v ersus velocity will

provide the time, in seconds, as depicte d in Fi gure

4

for

1200 feet at 583 fe et pe r second ( the conversion of lj. OO
mph) .
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Table 3 .

Survey Stat istics

Item

Number

Total surveyed

125

100.0

Total response

103

82 .5

19

18 . 4

Percent

Total near midai r
collisions

Table

4.

Percentage of Near Midair Co llisions t hat were
Reported to the FAA

Action

Percent

Yes

31

No

64

No reply to this item

Table

5.

5

Time Near Mi dair Collision Occurred

Time

Percent

Horning

26

Afternoon

74

Night

Table 6.

0

!lumber of Occurrences by Year

Year

Percent

1970

42

1969

48

~~

5

No rep ly to this item

5

21

Table

?.

Type Aircraft Involved and Their Average Speeds

Type of Aircraft

Percent of Total

Average Speed (mph)

95

125

Single-engine
1- to 3-place

63

102

4-place and up

32

148

Hulti-engine

5

230

Second party:
Single-engine

68

120a

Multi-engine

32

226a

aEstimation based upon average performance data of aircraft
as depicted in various sales manuals.

Table 8.

Purpose of the Flight

Operation

Percent

Business

26

Pleasure

48

Receiving flight instruction

10

Giving flight instruction
No reply to this item

5
11

22

Table 9.

Pilot Qualifications , Flight Hours , and
Percentage of Occurrence

License Held

Percent of
Total Involved

Average
Flight Hours

Range of
Hours

Student

26

35

10 -

75

Pri vate

53

338

65 -

800

Connnercial

21

950

Instrumenta

21

600 - 1300

5

Flight Instructora

aThese are additional ratings on the private and commercial
licenses, therefore flight hours have not been computed.

Table 10.

Medical Certificates Held and Restrictions Imposed
Type of
Restriction

Percent
Per Class

Percent \vi th
Restrictions

Class I

11

0

Clas s I I

26

20

Glasses

Class III

63

8

Glasses

Type

a

aSee FAR, Volume IX , Part 67, for descriptions of the
medical classificat ions .
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Table 11.

Flight Attitud e of Both Aircraft
Percent

Condition

You

Level flight
Climbing turn

Other

32

32

0

5

Turning

11

5

Landing

16

11

5

0

Descending to land

16

5

Descending

21

5

Climb

0

16

Take-off climb

0

11

Acrobatics

0

5

Unknovm

0

5

Take -off

Table 12.

Sighting of the Other Aircraft ReJative to
the Reporting Aircraft

Direction
Below- diverging

Percent

5

Below-converging

21

Same alti tud e -conv ergine

16

Same altitude

16

Above you

26

Be low you

16

Table 13.

Evasive Action Taken by Both Aircraft
Percent a

Action

You

Pull-up/right turn

Other

11

0

5

0

Pull-up/left turn

11

5

Pull-up abrupt

16

0

Descend abrupt

0

5

Descend

0

5

Descend/right turn

Pull-up/right turn abrupt

5

0

Right turn

32

5

Left turn

11

11

No action taken

11

69

aTotals may not 3um 1001o due to rounding, or in the case of
Other, the information t-ras not furnished .

Table

14.

Communications Between Aircraft and Ground
Control Facility at the Time of the Near
11idair Collision

Facility

Percent

Approach control

21

Departure control

5

Control to1-1er

16

Radar advisory

16

Flight service station

11

Air traffic control center

5

Unicorn

5

None

21

25

Table

15.

Type Navi gati on Being Used by Reporting Pilot

Navigation

Percent

V"riF Omni Range (VOR)

21

Pilotage

63

VOR/DNE

ll

VOR/Radar vectors

Table 16.

Cloud Proximity Re lative t o the Reporting Aircraft

Location

Percent

Belot-1 clouds
In/out of clouds
No clouds

Table 17 .
Condition
Clear
Broken

5

42
5

53

Sky Conditions at Time of Near Midair Collision
Percent

68
5

Overcast

ll

Scattere d

16

26

Table 1 8.

Flight Visibility

Range

Percent
miles

5

10 - 19 miles

11

0 - 9

5

20 - 29 miles

79

Above 30 miles

Table 19.

Rest rictions and Limitations to Visibility

Condition

Percent

47
5
5

Bright day
Bright night
Glari n g sun/bright day
Glaring sun/haze

5

Glaring sun

5

Haze/dawn

5

Haze/dus k

5
21

Ha ze

Table 20 .

FAA Fli ght Rules in use by Reporting Pilots

Flight Rules
Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
VFR with instrument flights rules clearance
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)

Percent

84
5
11

27

Table 21 .

Transponders Available and in Use

Condition

Percent

Available - not in use

0

Avia l able -in use

5

Not available

Table 22 .

95

Hazardous Vs Eon- hazardous Conditions

Condition

Percent

Hazardous

58

Non-hazardous

42

Number of near collisions in airport traffic area

L•7

Table 23 .

Reaction Time Availab l e Vs Closure Speed
and Distance Beb<een Aircraft

Closure Rate
(mph)

Distance at First Sic;hting
(feet)

Time to Reac t
(seconds)

310

3000

6. 7

L1.25

1300

2 .1

360

1300

2. 6

360

1500

2. 8

215

2600

8

240

1500

4.4

295

2100

4.8

.L.
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Table 22 reflects the percentage of near midair collisions considered to be ha zardous and those considered to be
nonhazar dous,

This consideration is based upon the initial

definition of a near midair collision made earlier in this
study ,

Table 23 presents an illustra tion of how much time

Has avai lable to those p ilots rep orting other aircraft at
or very ne a r their altitude,

Those t h ree p ilots whose

available reaction times Here only 2 .1, 2 .6, and 2,3 seconds
are considered to have encountered hazardo us conditions,
In all three cases the other aircraft were on collision
course d as rep orted on the da ta forms.

It is recogn ized,

hovrever , that it is extremely difficult to make accurate
judgements of the rela tive distances between aircraft in
fli ght .

On this basis the distances reported on t h e d ata

forms could be less than , or greater than , the true distance
between the sircraft .

The time available for evasive action

in therefo~e directly r elated to the accuracy of estimating
this dist ance .
Figures

5

an d 6 si1ovr pi ctorially the rela tive !J OS i tions

of the othe r aircr aft t o t h e reporting aircraft ,

Figure

5

indicates ·o ot:n the horizont al and vertical distances rep orted on t h e data forms .

These distan ces repre se nt the

clo sest dist anc e be tween t h e two aircraft involved .

Only

lj p ositions are depicted here because several of the re p orting pilots ne g lect e d to provide this particul ar information ,

Figure 6 indicates the p ositi ons of the other air-

craft re l at iv e to the nose of the rep orting pilot 's air -
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Key:
600

50
~

Horizontal distance in feet from
the pilot to the other aircraf t
Vertical distance is feet from
the p ilot to the other aircr aft

= Position

of the other aircraft

+ ~00
660

75

+

+

250

600 --l-1

o

450
150

rr 5ocf 4to
0

0

°
+

-1-

200

0

15ct
60

Fi gure

5.

+10 t
50 25

Closes t Proximity of Aircraft in the
Vertical Plane ( Not dra-vm t o scal e)
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Key:
12:00 =Position, on the clock, of the other
aircraft relative to the nose of the
reposting aircraft
500 = Distance from the pilot to the other
aircraft in feet (horizontally)

-t-

= Position of the other aircraft

12:00
--lr 660

12:00 'I
600
-t-12 :00

+ 500

1:30

+boo

12:00
+250
11:00
450

12:00

00

11•00
400
11:00
150

++

+

1 2:00

+ 10

/rh-f,-~-...__ _ _ _ 1 2 :00
50

~~~
J~

I

2:00

+300

4:00
+400

,

Figure 6.

Closest Proximity of Aircraft in the
horizontal plane ( Not drawn to scale)
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craft .

The dist=ces indicated are in r e fere n ce to azimuth

and do not reflect altitude information.

The p osition in -

formation is displayed in terms of where the other aircraft
were located relative to the clock, 12 o'clock being straight
ahead .

Her e again, the number of pilots providing this inf-

ormation, on their data forms, was less than the total reported near

mi~air

collisions .

Di scussion
In orde r to exemplify the conditions under which near
midair collisions may occur , severa l quotes are provided .
The3e quotes are taken directly from the Near Midair Collision Data Forms as they appeared in the remarks section .
It is not intended that cl1ey point to a particular type of
pilot buc r a ther to inct1cate several different situations
tnat may present themselves .
Situation 1.

A

student pilot Has receiving instruction

in a Piper Gherokee ll_j.O .

They ,;ere in the tra1·ric pa t cern

sho oting "touch and g oes" on a clear , brie;nt , 1'all day in
l9b9 .

The pilo t is quoted as follo;rs:

"I was making practice l ·mc!1ngs over Provo airpor t.
instructor 1-1as 1-11th me .
land .

About

15

Hy

.;:arly 1n d01mwind we called in to

seconds arter, chc Cessna cal l ed dOI·mHind.

He saH h1m behind us as I turned baselefl .

Just after t urn-

1ng into final approach the instructor asked where tne
Gessna Ha s .

<Te hela up 1·or r ive or ten seconds and saw che

otner ai r craft just belc H our prop e ller , a li ttle aheaa ana
aoout 20 - 30 fee t

be l ow .

We 1-1ere descending fast er t han
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he Has.

The instructor gave full power - pulled up -

turned right, out over Utah Lake.

The other aircraft was

unm,mre of cutting us short until we made radio contact with
him as he was land ing.

After He landed he told us he was a

new pilot - just i"inished his flight training.
Has Hith him.
Hhat I said .

His brother

They did hear us call in but weren't sure
Because my altitude was high during downvTind

they thought ue Here circling the field.

Ny instructor said

it uas his first - closest - and last near midair c ollision.
I felt the excitement more than the danger" .
Situat ion 2 .

Here H"e h ave a student pilot Hi th only 12

hours total flieht time .

He Has is a designated practice

area performing flight maneuve r s.

Here, again, the sky was

clear with no clouds , therefore wenther was not a factor.
The p1lot is quoted as follmTs:
"I am only

17

years old .

I really don ' t know if I would

call it a near midair but I was out on my second solo and
just practicing 360•s.

I checked all around for other planes

and c ouldn't see so I rolled into my 360 and when I rolled
out I looked up and there Has another p lane not far above me.
I didn't knoH Hhat to do, repc r' t it or not, s o I
e o at that.

ju.st let it

I ' m n ot sure of the date or time or anything

like that but I did the best I could.

I don't know whether

it wa s a near midair cause neitner has to move out of the

Hay".
This pilot Has probably correct in his evaluation of the
traffic in his area prior to 1nitiat1ng his maneuver.

In a
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Piper Cn erokee 14 0, s u ch as the one this student was flying,
it takes approximately 60 secoLds to complete a 360 degree
turn in a banked actitud e of 30 de g rees.

During that p e riod

an aircraft tr avel l ing at a s peed of 150 miles per hour
could cover

2.5

miles.

Chances are very good that a pilot

coula not see another a2rcraft at this distance.

It would

depend upon uhat the p2 lot was looking at jusc before scanning che horizon a n d whe ther or not the a2rcraft observ e d
wa s a g a2nst a background of mountains, haz e , etc.

Hore Hill

be said on t h is suoject i n che Conclusions and Recommendation
s e ct2on of t h is paper.
Situation

3.

ousiness trip.

Thi s student pilot was returning rrom a
He rep orts that he was descending for a land-

ing within a control zone .

The visibility was thre e milcn

and he was flying in and out of clouds .
that he was operating VFR witn an

~FR

He further rep orts

clearance.

The ocher

A.ircraf't was on climb-out after take - off and passed ••i thin

SOU fe e t or the student.
Several other cases such as situations 2nvolving very
near misses due to the failure of radar controllers to pass
traf1'ic information on to the pilot in su1'ricient time to
allovT hlm enough time ror pro p er search and to t ake the
necessary precautionary measur e s .

Safety lS always the

responsi bili ty of the piloc e ven if his l'light is being
controlled by a ground controller .

In 16 percent of' the

cas es reported, r a dar a dvisory s e rvices provided the required information too late f or the p ilots to perform the
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s canning ope rations neces sary to spot the traffic.

The

following quote from a 300 hour priv ate p ilot provide s insights into this problem.
Situa tion

I+·

"The other aircraft

~ras

coming fast.

Radar

advisory service advised of traffic, but right seat pass eng er and 1Jindow pillar obstructed vie1·r so that precious
added se conds Here used i n looking.

Background for the other

aircraft !vas mountain and his fli ght direction was ri ght
to·,rard my plane.

Hy hi e;h >-ring may have contributed as the

other aircraft !·Ias descending for a landing at Sa lt Lake City
and he may have been high Hhen I

!VUS

first loo king for him.

It appeared he 1vas diss i!'a tine; altitude with speed bu ildup.
Ey biggest irritation at the time was that radar advisory
e;ave me so little time to avoid the aircraf t."
Gro~~d

control radar advisory servi aes provide only azi-

muth inf ormation .

In other words they u sually (unles s re-

por ted to them by pilot s ) do not have altitude information .
On this bas is an advi:JOd aircraft is told only of possible
conflic t ing traffic >vi th reference to di:coection an<i rela t ive
s pe ed .

It t h en becomes tile pi lots res ponsibility to scan

the area in the direction reported by the controller and
o.lso to scan high and lou f or the tar ge t aircraft.
all takes considerable time .

This

The pilot quoted above came

Hithin 300 feet horizontally and 60 feet vertic a lly of the
ro.dar traffic .

This near midair collision is considered

to have been hazardous because a collision 1-ras avoi<ied by
chance only .
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOHMENIDATIONS

Conclusions
TI'e r esluts of this study clearly indicate that the
flying public of Utah, llevada, and Idaho, does experience
enumerable near mida ir collisions that go unreported .
Table

4 indicates that

6Le percent of the near midair coll-

isions cited in this study Here not reported to the FAA.

In

addition to this, the 31 pe rcent that were reported were not
necessarily reported to an official FAA office.

Some of the

reports lvere merely passed on to a flying service via unicorn
radio.

The conclusion here is that the FAA, although pre-

sented Hith some very impressive data through their study
of near midair collisions pe r AC 00-23, do not have s uffi cient inputs to render va lid conclusions about the general
aviation flying public as a whole.
An attempt

~1i ll

be made at this point to ansHer the

questions outlined earlier

~then

discussing the purpose of

this study.
Quest ion 1.

\Vhat pe rcentage of the 'flying popul ation

becomes involved in near midair collisions ?

Table 3 indi-

cates that of 103 res ponses, 19 were involved in a near midair collision.

This repres en ts

18.L~

perc ent of t he total

responses and means that during a given three year period,
g eneral aviation pilots , as a g roup, in Utah, Nevada , and
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Idaho, Hill have an 18,4 p ercent cha.>1ce of becoming involved
in a near midair collision,

This does not mean that each

pilot vrill have t h is rate of exposure.

This will depend on

a number of variables, such as ho•r often he flies, etc,

For

the statistically minded reader, the res u lts show that for
a 68 per cent level of confidence, the number of exposures
Hill vary from 14 . 8 to 22 ,0 percent (one sig:na equal to 3.6).
For a hm sigma level, or 95 percent confidence, the chance
of involvement varie s from 11.2 to 25,6 percent,
Q.uestion 2.

Are ueather co::1ditions a si t;n ificant factor

in ne a r mi dair collisions, if so, to Hhat extent?

A very

hiGh percentage of near midair collisions, reported in this
study, occurred under very good flying conditions,

Sixty-

eight percent of the re ported incidences occurred in clear
skies, 79 per cent ha d a visibility of great er than 30 miles,
In only two cases did 1-reather play a role in a near midair
collision,

These Here the cas es exemp lified earlier in

Situation 3, t-rith the student p ilot flyin G in and out of
clo:lds in a control zone, and the pilo t in Situation L~, vlho
•ms under the s urvei llance of a radar ground controller.
Question

3.

Do near midair collisions occur more often

-.rhile opera ting under visual flight rules (VFR) than under
instrument fli ght rul es ( IFR)?

Of the total number of pilots

reporting near rddair collisions, 84 percent Here being
conducted in accordance 1-1i th visual flight rul es .
doe s not mean that VFR operation is more hazardous.

This
It only

me ans that the n ilo ts re" ortine; near mi da ir collisions 1-;ere
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operatin(> VFR,

It vrould require a separate and much more

so:)histicated, test to determine the near midair colli s i ons
that may occur ..rhile flyin g on the gae es (operating IFR ).
Qu es tion

u,

l,fu.at type of' navigation is most of'ten us e d

and is this of' any signif'icance in creating a hazard?
purp ose of this question uas to

deterr.~ine

The

if' the air1·rays,

themselves, are too cro1.rded, and theref'ore create a h A.zardous environment.

This study h a s indicated the VOR to be

quite popluar, however, 63 p ercent of' the reported incidences occurred I·Ihile conducting the f'light the pilotage
te chnique of' navigation.

On this basis, the results of this

study are inconclusive in determini ng the significance of'
a navigational facility in cr ea ting a near collision hazard.
Question

5.

Is there any significant dif'f'erence in the

level or de:;ree of e::posure to a hazard betvreen the various
ty)es of' oper ation , such as business, pleasure , etc,?
Table 8 indicates that the pleas ure flight Has the most
frequent ope ration encountering near midair collisions, 1-rith
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percent of' the total being represented here.

Table 9

indicates that the majority of the pilots reporting near
midair collisions are private pilots (53 percent) as opposed
to student pilots (26 percent) or commercial pilots (21 percent) .

The inference here is that the private pilot is more

susceptible to the hazard .

This may not be the case, however ,

and unless the actual number of' private pilots f'lying pleasure fli t,hts and the actual nQmber flying business flights,
is !mown and compared ;ri th like f'igures for other pilots

making simi lar f'li s hts, the inference is invalid,

c'ie can

c;ay, though, that the ma jority of near midair collisions
seem to occur, according to t h o results of this s tu dy, on
f lis hts be ing conducted for p l easure purposes,
Question 6.

;·/hat particular flight attitude is more

lil{ely to be associ a ted vri th a ne ar midair collision?

The

most p redomina te fli ght attitudes tha t are prone to near
midair collisions are the descent, Hhich a.mounted to 21 percent of the total, a nd level flight, representing 32 percent.
The reasons for the tuo being predominate are, aircraft
s tructure, and pilot limitations,
can be minimized,

Both of these situations

The descent has already been d iscussed

in regard to the low wing versus the high wins blind spot
relations J:~ip,

and the preoc cupation of the pi lot during his

traffic pat tern and traffic area entries and exits,
respect it must be noted, again , that
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In this

percent of the near

midair collisions occurred in the airport traffic area,

The

airport traffic area includes control zones, traffic patterns ,
climb and descent corridors, and other designated areas ,
Question 7. Is altitude a si Gnificant factor in the near
midair collision potential, and if so, vrhat is the most
susceptible altitude?

The ansvrer to this question is partly

contained in the ansHer to the prior question.

The airport

traffic area has proved to be the most likely location for
a near midair collision,

Tho airport traffic area altitudes ,

in the area of an airport , then, are t h e most significant in
relation to near midair collision potentials.

39
Question 8.

Is there any type or category of aircraft

that has a greater exposure rate and Hhat is the reason for
this?

The type of aircraft involved is typically a single-

engine airplane.

Ni nety-fi7e

percent of the reporting

pilots Here flying a single-engine airplane.

Sixty-eight

percent of the second party aircraft were single-engine
airplanes.

Typically general aviation pilots fly single-

engine aircra ft because they are the least expensive to
rent or to purchase.
~uestion

9.

Do pilot qualific a tions or experience level

h av e any effect on either the nmnbe r of incidents or the
likelihood of being subjected t o a near midair collision?
The type of pilot reporting the gr eates t exposure to the
near midair collision was the private pilot, representing

53 percent, Hi th the student pilot follm-ring
~

average nmnber of fli [;nt hours of the private pilots

were 338 , ranging from 65 to Goo hours.

The student pilots

35 hours fli ght time, with a range of from 10 to

averase d

75

1-Ii th 26 percent.

hours.

This study Has not designed to determine if pilot

experience level, expressed in ho urs fl01m, had any meaningfu l effect on the probability of having a near midair collision .

Hany factors such as recency of flight experience ,

personal attitude of the p ilot, and the pilot's condition
1·1 0uld have to be investi g2. ted before further conclusions
could be dra-.m in this re c;ard .
A very interesting statistic to come out of this s tudy
is tha t 32 percent of the pilots i nvo lved reported execut-

ing a righ t turn in order to avoid the oncoming hazard .

TI1is is the prescribed procedure as set forth in the Fede ral
Aviation

~egu l at ions

(FAH, Volume VI. Part 91, 1970 ).

1\nother very interesting fact, and at the same time disconc ar ting, i s that 69 perc ent of the o the r aircraft were re ported to have executed no evasive action .
ass~~ed

I t must be

from tPis that the pilots of the se a ircr af t were

either m1a1-1are of the pending collision, or t!:ey di d not
consider evasive action necessary .

This assumption is based

upon the fact that s ome ac tion by both pilo ts is required by
laH (!";'.R , Vo lume VI , Part 91, 19 70 ).
Re commendations
There are seve r a l things tha t can be done to recluce the
chances of becoming involve d in a ne a r midair collision.

The

v ery hi3h r o.te of exposure 1vhile in level fli ght attitude
c an be a ttributed to one of two t hings .

The pilo t may not

be paying too much att ention to the de t a ils of visual a rea
s urveillance, or he may no t b e able to see the oncoming
airc raft .

'l'he l a tt er case is mor e likely t o happen than the

first, a s indicated in t h e follo Hing artic le published i n
the Febru ary, 1971 issue of the Ut ah Av iation News :
I·lYOPIA
1·/e 1 ve a ll had the disconce rt ine; experience of
lmo.vine; there's ano the r airplane at two o'clock,
ten mi l es aHay, and b e ing unable to see it -- unt il
it s uddenly pops up tuo or three mile s close, and y ou
tak e violen t evasive a ction i n the s p lit second before
collision Hould occur.
TI•e prob lem is that until y ou actually see the p l an e
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your eyes have nothin~ to lock on to and they drift
bet•~een near and far focus.
Surprisingly, thou-;h
you may think you're loo king ten mi les out Hhen you're
really only looking to just the other side of the
canopy Glass. On the ~ v erage , your eye is likely to be
focused someuhere between three and six feet.
But there is a solution. You can learn to mru{e your
eyes work for you ;rhen you're looking into an empty
vi:Ju al field.
The tric k is to make your eyes focus
at o ptical infinity and then stare out into the r;laring
void.
Optical infinity for the average p erson is only
about 30 or 35 feet.
So to run your focus out to
infini ty, look at your Hing tip, if it's that far m~ay ,
or at t he g round -- anythinG over 30 feet away. Then,
look for the bogie. Your eyes 1;ill remain focused at
infinity for about 20 or 30 seconds (Utah Aviation Neus,
1971).
Eyopia , then, rnay very well be the basis of many of the
near midair collision

prob lems.

Those pre cious seconds a

pilot spends lookinr; for other traff'ic, reported to him by
a radar controller, coul d a ll be in vain if his eyes are
focused only a few feet away.

This could very well be the

c ase if the pilot has been spending very much time inside the
cockpit, looking at the gages , or ch e cking the charts.
This kind of information (such as l'!YOP IA) is priceless,
and unfortunately not uidely distributed to the flying nub lic.
It is reommended that the FAA make this information personally
available to all pilots.

Although there are reams of very

good educational material available, by the FAA to the
general public, it is not made personally available to the
pilots .
The distribution problems faced by the FAA are be s t illustra.ted by t he ir Near I·1idair Collision study uhich has supposedly been brought to the public's attention

throu~h

the
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distribution of AC 00-23.
and

fli ~ht

This author is an active pilot

instructor with several thousand fli ,c;ht hours

logsed , and never has this information been made available
at any airport or fli ght operation.

How then can the gen-

eral aviation p ilot become mmre of the fli[;ht facts that
uould do him so much c;ood?

The answer is simply by assuring

that he personally receives a copy of all publications distributed by the FAA.

Among them being the facts concerning

the inability of the eye to focus on a glaring void.
,\11 of' this if course presupposes that the pilot, himself ,

is a;mre of his o\m inefficiencies and is willing to accept
more of his 01m res ponsibilities .
(and his

passen ~ers)

In order for the pilot

to survive, he must spend more time

looking for conditions and situations that HOUld be conducive
to a midair collision .

Once a pilot is licensed by the FAA

there is no furth er requirement fer him to receive additional
flisht instruction or pro ficiency checks.

He , theref<r e ,

either conscientiously strives to better himself, or he becomes proeressively inefficient .

One answer to the problem

of pilot complacency would be compulsory proficiency checks
on a recurring b asis .

This of course Hill not prevent Hanten

disregard of the rul es or apathy in r egard t o self discip line
;;hen then the check pilot is not ri ding uith him .

It ui ll,

ho;mver , keep him current on t he l ate st flight techniques
and uill help point out ue oJmesses and faulty procedur es.
To supplement the added vig ilance of the pilot and his
neVI foun d lmO\·lleds e on his seeing abilit i es , there is r:1ore
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that c an be done.
aware of the

The radar controller can also be made

li~itations

ing problems.

of the pilot's eyes and h is focus-

'tli th this in mind, the oo ntrol l er shoul d be

cognizant of the necessity to give the pilot ample time to
adjust t o the distant environment and to spot the airplane
that has been repo rted.

The controller then, should report

the target information much sooner than is generally the case.
Finally the construction of an airplane may be such that
it renders adequate visibility impossible.

This is true of

both hi(;h Hinc; and low winG aircraft, particularly ;.;here a
low •·ring ail•craft is descending ••i th a high vling aircraft
beneath it.

Neither c£ the tHo pilots can see the other.

To remedy this situat ion would mean making some very minor
changes to the aircraft structure.
The high wing airplane could be modified such that the
area above the pilot 's head is made into a skyligh t.

This

can be purchased as optional equipment in some model Cessnas.
Another method, in order to preserve the plush interior of
the hi(;her priced aircraft, Hould be to install a prism on
the fuseb.ge just above the pilot and aft of the windshield.
The prism
lir:~ed

~-rould

be installed outside and could be stream-

to reduce drag .

It •wuld then act as a detecting

device to inform the pilot of any activity withi n the blind
spot area of the airplane.
device could be used.

Figure 7 indicates how this

It •muld also be very helpful for

nigh '·rinc; airplane pilo ts to see ahead as they execute a
turn.

The

nor~al

turn in this type of a ircraft requires
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that a w!.n c; be louered in the direction o:f the turn , thus
rendering the area into the turn completely b lind.
The se problems are not so pronounced in the low wing airplane.

Fortunately this pilot can see into his turns, hou-

ever, he still cannot see directly above him as uell as he
1-muld like.

This is not a major problem 1-ri th this aircraft,

hoHever, and it can easily be solved in much the same manner
as 1-ras recommended :for the high wing airplane.

The problem

uith tho lo1-1 wing airplane is to see directly beneath it.

A

rel at ively simp le device could be installed to eliminate this
hazard as depicted in Fi cure 8.

Here we have installed a

hinged mirror that is controlled by the pilot.

Whenever he

uishes to see b eneath his airplane, he merely opens the :flap
containing the mirror, and has a look.

This device would

also serve as an excellent means o:f checkinG the landing
r; ear.

In the end the measure o:f success of any

:fli~ht

safety

prosram is p roportional to the energy expended to achieve its
success.

The general aviation pilot, himself, is the only

person that con control the effectiveness of any contrived
safety device, precautionary procedure, or regulation.

Only

hi s alertness to the details of :flyine vTil l have any real
effec t on the level of success in eliminating near midair
collisions.
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Scanning
Area

Prism

Figure 7.

Optical Scanning Device and Skylights ror
High Wing Aircrart
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....,

Scanning
Area

Optical
Scanner

Fi gure 8 .

Optical Scanning Devi c e and Skylights f or
Low Wing Aircraft
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App endix A
Monte Carlo Simulations

Table

2l~ .

Near Vd.dair Collision Simulation
Percent Difference
From Expected Hean
of Twenty Percent

Trial

Positive

1

108

392

1.6

2

106

396

1,2

3

117

383

3.4

L~

103

397

0.6

5

99

401

0.2

6

102

398

0. 4

Ne gative

7

96

404

0.8

8

108

392

1.6

9

109

391

l.tl

10

93

407

1.4

Average mean .

. ..

.1.3
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Appendix A (Continued)

Table 25 .

Positive Control Airspace Simulation

Trial

Posi tive

1

2

4.98

o.6

2

4

4.96

0.2

3

2

498

0.6

4

6

494.

0.2

5

5

4.95

o.o

6

1

499

o.8

7

2

498

0.6

8

6

494

0.2

9

6

494

0.2

10

4

496

0.2

Negative

Average mean.

Percent Dirrerence
From Expected Mean
or One Percent

..

0.36
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Appendix A (Continued)

Table 26.

Precision Radar Approach Simulat ion

Trial

Positive

Negative

Percent Dirrerence
From Expected Ilean
or One-halr Percent

1

2

498

0.1

2

1

499

0.3

3

1

499

0.3

4

1

499

0.3

5

0

500

0.5

6

0

500

0.5

7

0

500

0.5

8

0

500

0.5

9

0

500

0.5

10

0

500

0.5

Average mean .

. . 0.4
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Appendix B
NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION DATA
DATE OCCUAED :

TIME OCCUARED:oLOCA

DYES

INITIALLY REPORTED 9Y RADIO
REPORTED TO

D

HAVE NEVER HAD A

OoMT

NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION

DNO

MEDICA L
CERTIFICATE

ICLASS

LIMITATIONS

IN TYPE AIRCRAFT INVO L VED

YOUR AIRCRAFT (make, model, year)

FLIGHT
TIME
YOUR AL T!TUDE :J L TIMETER SET TO:
MSL

YOUR HEAD"G

I

I

AI RCAAFT DAMAGE

YESD

HG!

OK NOT

TRUE AIRSPEED

C]MPH

PERSONAL INJURY

NOD

vesD

RATINGS

0

NO

TYPE OPERA TION

~,-S-<~od_o_o,~----------t-,--A-11-T,-,~~----~--,

OTHER AIRCRAFT \make, model. vear, other 1nfo)

Private

Business

f--+-c=-o_m_m_o_":ial;---------+-+ Pleasure
LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE (nearest C>IV. state)

--

Receive Instruction
Other (Specify)

NEAREST NAVIGATION, FIX, FACILITY, OR AIRPORT

Distance

Degrees from

Direction

YOUR AIRCRAFT WAS
On Airways

FIRST SAW OTHER A / C

ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS

COMMUN I CATION WITH
Tower

Below You

Off Airways

Clear

Same Altitude

Vis<bil<tY (mi l es)

Corwerging

Departure Control
In Co,-,uol Zone

Dn.erg<ng

Approach Control

You OvNIOOI<
6CA IP AR Control

FLIGHT CONDITIONS

Your fight

Out B'D From Airport

Your Left
Glar<r,g Sun

None
Posnive Control A<r

Olf,er Overtook

Other ISp<>c<IYI

EVASIVE ACT ION

~~-----------
Other (Spee dy)

PHASE OF FLIGHT
OPERATING CONDITION

Pull Up

You phcr

Thun<1HrsTorm
Right Turn

Preciw<tallon
V F R w<th IF A Clea rance

Cl<mh

IFA wi t h No C <earance

Dr•sct>ndrn"

Abrupt

Lev "I !" I i ~Jh 1

Cog

IFR IVF R On Top
OVFR/ADIZ

L~rn <t $

Turnon y

Other (Spec <ly)

C' THER AIRCRAFT OBSERVED A T - - - - - - - Holcl""l Pilt!<'rn

TYPE NAVIGATION USED

O nu•r ISp•·cdvl

FIRST SIGHTING

I

CLOSEST

! PROXIMITY
CLOUD PROXI MI 'I Y

lf'-H:C:O:.CAC.:IZ:c___-ll

I

VERT

i

MARKINGS or LIGHTS I he snccif•cl

f--+--::-------------++c--'-------------j YOUR

A RCRA F T

~+--------------+-+-8-"_we_
.''_"_c_.w_"_'------lOT HE

A 1\ IRCA 4fT

Raclilr

~~~~~~~~.

D ISTANCE BETI,ft,£EN AIRCRAFT

I

VPctOr

~----------~L-------~
OthN ISpo,r<lvt

TRANSPONDER
AVAILABLE
YES

l

Vf-RT

MODE/CODE

D NOD

vesO No[]

WHAT FtAST OIAECTlD ATTENTION TO OTHER

COMMt

NTif~lCOM MENDATtONS

AIRCRAFT~

(USE REV ERSE SIDE I
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Appendix C
Postcard Mailed With Data Form

I have mailed the completed questionaire ,

"Near Midair

Collision Data" in res p onse to your independent survey.
Name _______________________________________________

c==J Yes,

I am interested in receiving a copy of the

research summary of near midair collision hazards
to general a vi ation .

0

Please

send---,~~on---additional
·
number

data forms.
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Appendix D
Initial Letter to Accompany Data Forms

121 South Third East Street
Smithfield, Utah 84335

Dear Fellow Pilot:
Here is your opportunity to do something for general aviation safety.
I am conducting research into the possible hazards to general aviation associated with near midair collisions .
A
near midair collision is said to have occurred if one or
both aircr·aft involved :found it nec essary to take evasive
action in order to prevent a collision. This research is
being conducted in ~onjunction with a masters thesis a nd is
in :g£ way connected Hith any federal or civil regulatory
agency .
I am do inc; it c·ompletely on my o•m.
Your name vias selected randomly from a listing of pilots
residing in Utah , Nevada , and Idaho.
I am asking you to
take a feH minutes of your time to complete the enclosed
form . You have my assurance that the form will remain com pletely anonymous .
Please mark the appropriate blocks, fold
the :form , fasten it , and place it in the mail. You may mark
as many blocks as are necessary to des cribe the condition .
If you have not been exposed to a near midair collision,
just mark the block in the upper ric;ht hand corner and return the form .
If you have experienced tvlO near midair collisions , you may
indicate this by marking the blocks with a number one for
the first incident and a number two for the second .
Should
you be desirous of more forms to report additional incidents ,
please let me know .
The information supplied by should cover
the past three years , January 1 , 1968 thru December 31 , 1970 .
Your response to this request is imperative becau se any nonresp onse would render the conclusions dravm from the collect ed data invalid. In other words, I must knoVT if you h ave
s ubmitt e d the d a ta form .
In order forme to knoH this and
still keep your form anonymous, I have enclosed a po stc ard
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Appendix D (Continued)

with your name on it, After you have completed the data
form vTOuld you nlease check the annronriate blocks on the
card and place it in the mail along with your data form .
Your he lp will be greatly appreciated by me and genera l
aviation as a Hhole. Thank you.

Sincerely ,

Robert B. Hulsman
Graduate School of Business
Utah State University, and
Fli ght Instructor
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Appendix E
Follmv-up Letter

121 South Third East Street
Smithfield , Utah 84335

Dear Fellow Pilot:
DID YOU CLOSE YOUR FLIGHT PLAN ? ?
I 'll bet those are words you've heard before. Al most everyone 'dho has done any flying has heard them at one time or
another. People are just plain forgetful at times, I guess.
For instance I'll bet you forgot to mail me your data form
on Near Nidair Collsions. Would you PLEASE take a moment
right noH to complete the enclosed forms and put them in
the mail .
I uant to emphasize a ga in that you ~ril l remain anonymous .
No onu vrill kno~r from whom the information has been gathered .
You need have no fear of an reuunitive action taken as a
result of information to this study. The enclosed card is
merely an indicator for my own use to tell me who has responded.
If you have nothad a near midair collision just mark the
upper right hand corner of the form and p l ace both the form
and the c ard in the mail .
Don ' t be accused of being the one that never clo se s his
flight p lan. Act now.
The data should cover the t~~ee year period J an .
thru Dec . 31, 1970.

1, 1968

Sincerely,

Robert B. Hulsman
Graduate School of 3usiness
Utah State Univ e rsity, and
Flight Instructor
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Appendix F
Second Follow-up Letter

1 2 1 South Third East Street
Smi thi'ield, Utah 8L~33 5

HAYDAY !! l

MAYDAY!!!

HAYDAY l ll

AIRHAN IN DISTR;<;SS

Dear FellaH Pilot:
If you have not comp le ted the enclo se d data form you may
be re3 p onsible for the dintress signal you just read.
~he
time is fast drawing near Hh en the data I have requested
from you must be received.
Won't you p lease sit down for
a few minutes and comp lete the data form and postcard .
As
I have said pre viously, you have my guarantee that no one
Hi ll ever know vrho s ubmitted vrhat data .
In fact, I 1fill be
the only one to !mow if you submitted any data at all
(through the p ostcard).
If you have never ha d a near midair collision please
return the data and postcard anyway .
I •muld much rather be executing a victory roll than
calling a distr ess plea .
Won't you please act now.

Sincerely ,

Robert B. Hulsman
Gr adu at e School of B·J.sines s
Utah State University , and
Fli g ht Instructcr
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Appendix G
Calculations Used to Determine the Adequacy of Response

Tile determination not to send out a fourth letter, in
order to solicit more response, vras made b ased on the data
derived from the follovring calculati ons .

Table 27.

Letter

Response Rece ived From Each Letter, in Number
and Precentage
Number of
Letters Sent

Number of
Responses

Percentage
Received

lst Letter

125

56

45

2nd Letter

69

29

L>2

Jrd Letter

40

18

45

If a fourth letter were dispatched, it uould be reasonably safe to assume that the response generated from it
would fall between

42 and

45 ~:; .

vii th only 22 pilot s not

responding at this time , 45~s of this number would provide
an additional nine responses .

Based upon the current ratio

of near midair collisions to total responses , that is ,
to

19

103, one can assume that for every response we would

expect O. l8l> near midair collisions .
additional

Tilis would yield an

1. 66 pilots reporting a near midair collision in

response to the fourth letter .

Since fractional pilots may

be excluded, the total near midair collision occurrenc es
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Appendix G (Continued)

reported would increase from 19 to 20 , and the total res ponses would increase from 103 to 112.

These fi gures yield

a decrease from 1 8 . 1~ ~; to 17. 9;; p rob ability of oc currence of
a near midair collision .
to be insignificant.

This small difference is considered
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Appendix H
Raw Data as Extracted from the Data Forms

'r able 28 .

RaH Data

Item Surveyed

Nmnber of Occurrences

Total number surveyed

125

Total nmnber responding

103

Total near midair collisions
Initially reported
not reported

19
6

12

No reportin8 respome

1

Occurrences in the morning

5

Occurrences in the afternoon

14

Single-engine aircraft (first party )

18

Uulti-engine aircraft (first party)
Single-engine aircraft (second party )

1
13

Multi-engine aircraft (second party)

6

Business flight

5

Pleasure flight

9

Receiving fli 8ht instruction

2

Giving flight instruction

1

No response to type operation

2

Student p ilots

5

Private pi lots

8

Pri vate pilots Hith instrument ratings

2
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Appendix H (Continued)

Item Surveyed

Number of Occurrences

Commercial pilots

l

Commercial p ilots tvi th i nstrument rating s

2

Co!?1lllercial pilots tri th ins tructor r a ting s

l

Class I medicals

2

Class II medicals

5

Cla ss I I I medicals

12

Level flight - you

6

Level fl ight - oth er

6

Climbing turn - other

l

Turning (level f light) - you

2

Turning (level fli ght) - other

2

Lo.nding - you

3

Landing - other

2

Ta ke-off - you

l

Take-off - other

0

Descending to land - you

3

Descending to

l~nd

- other

l

Descending - you

4

Descending - other

l

Climb - other

3

Take-off climb - other

2

Ac r oba tics - oth er

l
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It em Surveyed

Number of Occurrences

UnknoHn -other

l

Be lol-T - diverging

l

Below -

~nver g ing

LJ.

Same altitude - converging

3

So.me altitude

3

Above you

5

Be lO\-T you

3

Pull-up and right turn -you

2

Pull-up and right turn abrup t -you

l

Pull-up and left turn -you

2

Pull-up an d left turn -oth er

l

Pull-up o.brupt -you

3

Descend a bru··) t -other

l

Descend -other

1

Descend and rieht turn -you

1

i~ i::;ht

turn -you

6

Ri r;ht turn -other

l

Left turn -you

2

Left turn -other

2

Ho action taken -you

2

Jlo action taken -oth er
Appro ach control

13

4
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Ap p endix H (Continued)

Item Sur' veyed

!':umber of Occurrences

Dep arture control

1

Control tov1er

3

lt:J.do.r advisory

2

Plic ht s ervice sta tion

2

Air tro.i'fic control cen ter

2

Unicorn

1

JITo crommunic a tions

3

VO R

3

Pilotage

12

VOR/DJ-8

2

VOR/ro.dar follmving

1

VOR/radar v e ctors

1

Be low clouds

8

In and out of clouds

1

No clouds

10

Clear sky

13

Broken clouds

1

Overcast sky

2

Scat t ered clouds

3

Ze ro - nine miles visibili t y

1

10 - 19 mi l e s visibility

2

20 - 29 miles vis i bi l ity

1
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Item Surveyed

Number of Occurrences

30 and n.bove miles visibility

15

Glaring sun ;Ti th h aze

1

Glaring sun - brieht day

1

Glaring sun

1

:rtaze at dusk

1

Haze at da•m

1

Haze

4

Er i sht day

9

Bright ni ght

1

Visual flight rules (VFR)

16

VFR •·;/instrument flight rules clearance ( IFR)

1

IFR Hi th a clearance

2

Transp onder available - not used

0

Tr&nsponder ava ilable - used

1

Trans p onder not available

18
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state University in 1971.
Professional Exueri ence: 1948 to 1968 a member of the
Unite d Sta t es Air Fo rce; 1969 to present, a student
and r etired military; h older of' FAA commer cial pilot
certi£icate Hith sinsle and mul ti - en::;ine and instrunent ratings , certifie d FAA fli3ht ins tructor f'or
airplanes and ins trun cnts, certified F:\.A ground
ir.structor for primary , adv~.nced , and instruraont
c:;round schools , and FAA certified airframe and
powerplan t mechani c.

